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W
ho am
 I?  W
hy am
 I here?
•
Served on several security 
committees and “big incident” 
response teams at UCB.
•
Limited time security strategist 
for ESnet.
•
W
orked with Nick Buraglio
within ESnetto develop 
security controls tailored to the 
Science DMZ.
•
Interested in Science DMZ for 
many years…
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Motivations
•
I have more recently been a bit concerned about how security is 
“done” in R&E.
–
Too much top-down policy and “control” orientation.  (This 
was necessary at one point, but I am not sure it is now.)
–
Checkbox compliance.
–
Lack of good risk assessment.
–
Failure to account for network functional needs (leading to 
Joe St. Sauver’sidea of a “Network Usability Officer).
–
Equating “controls” with “security.”
•
The Science DMZ has emerged out of a similar set of concerns, 
but we’re currently hampered by some myths.
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Motivations
•
The big myth:  The main goal of the Science DMZ is to avoid 
firewalls and other security controls.
–
Leads to all sorts of odd (and wrong) claims like:
•
“Our whole backbone is a Science DMZ because there is 
no firewall in front of the backbone.”
•
“The Science DMZ doesn’t allow for anysecurity controls.”
•
“The Science DMZ requires a default-permit policy.”
–
The reality is that the Science DMZ emphasizes reducing 
degrees-of-freedom, reducing the number of network devices 
(including middleboxes) in the path, eliminating devices that 
can’t perform, and ensuring that the devices that remain in 
the path are capable of large-scale data-transfer caliber 
performance.
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Motivations
•
My goal is to break down this myth by viewing the Science DMZ 
as a security architecture.
•
That is, by thinking about Science DMZ as a form of security 
control, not just something that needs to be controlled.
•
At the same time, Science DMZ enables us to do a better job of 
risk-based security through segmentation.
8/19/16
6
Risk-based vs. Control-based Security
•
Risk-based (ideal form):
–
Identify risks (impact and likelihood over a period of time).
–
Identify and/or create controls that are specifically designed 
to mitigate those risks.
–
Apply controls as necessary.
•
Control-based (ideal form):
–
Select controls from a checklist or standard.
–
Controls are, or at one point were, believed to mitigate a 
general set of risks.
–
Apply controls (more controls==better security).
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Risk-based vs. Control-based Security
•
Most security experts prefer risk-based security
–
Control-based security: apply controls “because the standard 
says so.”
–
It’s actually hard to find, in the literature, anyone who likes or 
prefers control based security.
–
Broad application of firewalls (e.g. large border firewall), often 
viewed as control-based security.
•
So why do we still practice control-based security in many 
instances?
–
Risk based security is actually pretty hard.
–
Risk assessment itself is hard.
–
Determining if a risk is actually being mitigated is hard.
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Risk-based vs. Control-based Security
•
The non-falsifiability of security assessments (Microsoft 
Research paper):
–
Indicates difficulty with fully assessing risk (but also 
effectively dismisses control-based security).
–
In simple terms, it’s easy to find cases where a security 
breach w
ouldn’t have happened if a particular security control 
were in place, but it’s pretty much impossible to say that a 
security breach that didn’t happen, would have happened, if a 
security control hadn’t been in place.
–
Early days of firewall logging: “Our firewall prevented 
1,789,034 attacks last week!”
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Risk-based vs. Control-based Security
•
Other things that make risk-based security hard:
–
It’s labor-intensive.
–
It may be more expensive up-front, but likely cheaper in the 
long run.
–
Rumsfeld’s razor: W
hat about all of the unknown unknowns?
–
“Nobody ever got fired for having a firewall.”
•
Moreover: The set of risks at a research lab or university 
cam
pus dem
onstrably vary across the resources that are 
attached to the network.
•
However, this turns out to be more of an argument against 
control-based security.
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Network Segm
entation
•
Think about your residence hall networks, business application 
networks, and the networks that are primarily in research areas.
•
The risk profiles are clearly different, so it makes sense to 
segment along these lines.
•
Your institution may already be doing this for things like HIPAA 
and PCI-DSS.  W
hy?  Because of the controls!
•
The Science DMZ follows the same concept, from a security 
perspective.
•
An example here is how using a Science DMZ to segment 
research traffic (especially traffic from specialized research 
instruments) can actually im
provecampus security posture.
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Network Segm
entation and the Science DMZ: An 
Exam
ple
•
I typically look at two examples:
–
Scenario 1: Scientific Instruments
–
Scenario 2: HPC clusters
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Scenario 2: HPC Clusters
•
Compute clusters may have specialized software for scheduling 
jobs or managing parallel nodes and resources.
•
Most nodes may be on private network.
•
Bastion hosts, with various AUTHNZ schemes –may also need 
specialized software:
–
2FA
–
Instrumented SSH
•
DTNs may also need specialized software:
–
Globus
–
High-throughput data transfers
–
Special filesystems
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Scenario 2: HPC Clusters
•
In such a situation, your compute cluster should not also be your 
DTN.
•
Much easier to secure if you separate these functions.
•
Try to keep things as standard as possible on as many machines 
as possible.
•
Separation of functions allows for better risk-assessment and 
more carefully-tailored controls.
•
Controls should be matched to the thingthat you’re protecting.
•
Avoid one-offs if possible, but if you have to have them, make 
sure they’re well-designed, well-managed, and well-documented!
•
The Science DMZ helps with all of these things.
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Conclusions and Im
plications
•
Think about what the Science DMZ is trying to do.
–
Improve performance, both by removing impediments and 
improving the performance of the devices that must be in line.
–
Ease troubleshooting.
–
In general, reduce degrees of freedom from science 
networks.
–
Maximize performance and
security and resiliency.
•
A lot of campuses are building ”distributed Science DMZs” or 
“Science Networks.”  These are good, but they may not realize 
the full benefit.
•
W
hen I think about the problems we are trying to solve, I still 
wonder if layering “SDN” on top will be an answer (let alone “the” 
answer).
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